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 The No Show Paradox (there is a voter who would rather not vote) is known 
to affect every Condorcet voting function. This paper analyses a strong version of 
this paradox (there is a voter whose favorite candidate loses the election if she votes 
honestly, but gets elected if she abstains) in the context of Condorcet voting 
correspondences. All Condorcet correspondences satisfying some weak domination 
properties are shown to be affected by this strong form of the paradox. On the other 
hand, with the exception of the Simpson-Cramer Minmax, all the Condorcet 
correspondences that (to the best of our knowledge) are proposed in the literature 
suffer this paradox. 







In the theory of voting, the prospects of finding a best voting method have been 
disappointing, due to the negative results obtained through the systematic axiomatic 
analysis employed during the last half of this century, including the Arrow 
Impossibility Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite result, with its subsequent 
developments and refinements. We know now that no voting method simultaneously 
fulfills some minimal properties that apparently are required by any reasonable 
method, that is to say, no method is free from paradoxes (failures to satisfy some 
intuitively compelling properties).  
 However, it still makes sense to analyze and compare methods in order to 
select a reasonable one for a given setting. In this task of confronting methods and 
choosing the right one, perhaps the two main families are the Condorcet and the 
Positional family. 
 The interest and relevance of Condorcet voting methods stem from their 
fidelity to the democratic principle which asserts that if there exists a candidate that 
is favored by a majority of voters (in a face to face comparison) over any other, this 
candidate should be the only one chosen. This is called the Condorcet property. For 
the definition and analysis of the best known Condorcet methods, see Fishburn 
(1977), Tideman (1987), Laffond et al (1995), and Peris and Subiza** (1999). 
 On the other hand, the Positional or Scoring methods, and in particular the 
Borda method, aggregate the preferences of voters through a scoring technique 
which in some way extracts a measure of the intensity of these preferences. These 
methods have a normatively appealing consistency property (if two electorates are 
combined, the global result is coherent with the partial results). For the definition 
and analysis of the Positional methods, see Young (1974, 1975) and Saari (1990). 
 Young and Levenglick (1978) have established the incompatibility of the 
Condorcet and consistency properties. A similar, but independent, property called 
Participation (none of the voters is disillusioned  by submitting his true ballot) has 
also been shown in Moulin (1988) to be incompatible with the Condorcet property. 






 This paper, which follows Moulin (1988) and extends some results from 
Pérez (1995), explores the incidence in Condorcet voting correspondences of a 
strong form of the paradox (from now on called Strong No Show Paradox, or SNSP 
for short) in which there is a voter V1 whose favorite candidate loses the election if 
V1 votes honestly, but gets elected if V1  abstains. 
 Although not all Condorcet methods suffer from the Strong No Show 
Paradox, the Simpson-Cramer Minmax method is, as far as I know, the only 
exception among those proposed in the literature. 
 Section 2 presents the basic terminology and some known results. Section 3 
defines the SNSP, and identify some weak properties that imply the paradox. 
Section 4 analyses, with the help of these properties (whenever possible), which 
known correspondences abide by the paradox, and section 5 concludes the paper 





2. TERMINOLOGY AND SOME KNOWN RESULTS.  
 
The terminology of Fishburn (1977) and Laffond et al (1995) will be used whenever 
possible, with few modifications. 
 Let X = {x1,x2,...,xn} be a finite set with two or more candidates. Preferences 
of any voter are supposed to take the form of a complete ranking, that is to say, a 
linear (strict and complete) order l over X. We say l = xyzt... to denote the preference 
order in which x is the most preferred candidate, y is the second one, and so on, and 
a l b means that a is preferred to y in l. 
 Given the set of candidates X = {x1,x2,...,xn}, and any finite set V = 
{1,2,...,m} with one or more voters, we call a Situation any pair (X,p), where p is a 
preference profile over X from V, that is to say, a m-tuple of orders over X, each one 





 We call Voting Correspondence (from now on VC) any function f which 
maps any situation (X,p) to a non-empty subset of X, f(X,p). The elements of f(X,p) 
are the chosen candidates  (the winners) over X from the preference profile p. Given 
any two VCs f and g, we say f is a refinement of g if and only if f(X,p)Íg(X,p) for 
every situation (X,p).  
 Since we will consider only anonymous VCs (all voters are equally 
considered), a preference profile over X from V can also be described by specifying 
how many of the m voters from V sustain any of the n! linear orders on X. 
 Given any X, any two disjoint sets of voters V1={1,2,...,m1} and  V2={m1+1 , 
m1+2,...,m1+m2}, and any two preference profiles p1 and p2 over X from, 
respectively, V1 and V2, we can merge these two profiles in order to obtain a new 
profile over X, but now originated from V1ÈV2. This new profile will be called 
p1+p2. 
 Let (X,p) be any situation with n candidates and m voters:  
Given any two different candidates x, y from X, p(x,y) means the number of 
voters in p which prefer x to y. Because ties are not allowed in any voter's ballot, 
p(x,y)+p(y,x)=m. The square nxn matrix Mp, whose entries are p(x,y), will be called 
the Paired Comparison Matrix for (X,p). In this matrix, for any given candidate 
there is a row (say the i-th row) and a column (the i-th column). For every candidate 
x, the sum of the off-diagonal row entries in Mp is called the Borda Score of x. 
 Candidate x is said to beat y, denoted by xWpy, if and only if p(x,y)>p(y,x). If 
we use ³ instead of >, we have the relation x beats or ties y, which is denoted by 
xUpy. Candidate x is said to beat indirectly (beat or tie indirectly), denoted by 
xWWpy (xUUpy) if and only if there are k candidates x1, x2, ..., xk in X such that x= x1 
R x2 R... R xk = y, being R=Wp (R=Up). If x beats any other, then x is called the 
Condorcet candidate.  
The situation in which the set of candidates is ZÍX, and the profile is the 
restriction to Z of profile p, is called (Z,p/Z). The comparison matrices of this new 
situation are Mp/Z and Tp/Z . 
 For every order l:  x1x2...xn of the candidates, the sum  åi<j p(xi , xj) will be 





attains y through l in (X,p) if and only if there is a sequence of distinct candidates 
a1, a2, ..., aj , with x=a1 and y=aj , such that ai l ai+1 and p(ai , ai+1)³p(aj , a1) for 
i=1,...,j-1. The order l is called a stack of (X,p) if and only if xi l xj  implies that  xi 
attains xj through l in (X,p). 
Let us call Bipartisan Plurality Game of (X, p) the two-player symmetric 
constant-sum game in which X is the set of pure strategies, and the payoffs for the 
profile of strategies (x,y) are: 
If x ¹y,  u1(x,y) = p(x,y) and u2(x,y)=p(y,x) 
If x=y,  u1(x,y) = u2(x,y) = m/2 
 In order to completely relate the terms p(x,y) and the payoffs of this game, 
we will suppose that all the entries p(x,x) of the main diagonal will be set as equal to 
m/2. This technical convention does not significantly affect any previous concept or 
result, and facilitates some definitions and computations. Thus,  Mp is the payoff 
matrix of the row player. 
 Any change in Mp by which a unit is added to the off-diagonal entry p(x,y) 
and subtracted from p(y,x), is called an elemental interchange in Mp. Any change 
in (X,p), by which two consecutive candidates x and y in a voter's order interchange 
their position in that voter's order, is called an elemental interchange in (X,p). 
 Following Fishburn (1977), we will distinguish three types of VCs. The 
correspondence f is said a C1, C2 or C3 Correspondence if, respectively: 
 C1: For every situation (X,p), the set of winners f(X,p) depends only on  
the Wp  relation.  
 C2: f is not a C1-Correspondence and for every situation (X,p), f(X,p)  
   depends only on the Paired Comparison Matrix Mp.  
 C3: f is neither a C1-Correspondence nor  a C2-Correspondence. 
 
Definition 1: A VC f is called Condorcet if and only if for every situation (X,p),  
(xWpy   "yÎX \{x}) implies f(X,p)={x}. 
That is to say, if there is a Condorcet candidate, it will be the only winner. 
 





situations (X,p1) and (X,p2),  f(X,p1)Çf(X,p2)¹Æ  implies  f(X,p1+p2)=f(X,p1)Ç 
f(X,p2). 
In other words, if some candidates are chosen for profile p1 and profile p2, they, and 
only they, are chosen when the two profiles are merged. This property characterizes, 
along with Anonymity and Neutrality, the positional choice correspondences, whose 
best known examples are the Plurality rule (the winners are those who are the most 
preferred candidates by a highest number of voters) and the Borda rule (the winners 
are those who obtain the highest Borda Score). See Young (1975), and see also 
Young (1974) for a characterization of the Borda rule where the Consistency 
property plays a fundamental role. 
 The following property, from Moulin (1988), is defined in the context of 
Voting Functions (VCs which, for any situation, chose only one candidate), which 
he calls Voting Rules. 
 
Definition 3: A Voting Function f satisfies the Participation property if and only if 
for any given pair of situations (X,p) and (X,v), where profile v has only one voter,  
(f(X,p) = {x} and x is preferred to y in v)  implies f(X,p+v) ¹ {y}. 
 
That is to say, if x is the winner for a situation and a new voter who prefers x to y is 
added, candidate y will not become the winner. From the point of view of the new 
voter, he would do better if he abstained, because submitting his ballot would result 
in the election of a less preferred candidate. If we apply Moulin's terminology, 
failing to satisfy Participation means that the No Show paradox sets in. 
 
2.1 Some known results. 
 
The incompatibility of the above two properties with the Condorcet property is 
shown in propositions 1 and 2 below, established respectively in Young and 
Levenglick (1978) and Moulin (1988). 
 





Proposition 2: No Condorcet Voting Function satisfies the Participation property. 
 
Consistency and Participation are not logically related. Moreover, Moulin (1988) 
proved that Participation does not imply nor is implied by the Reinforcement 
property, which is a natural translation of Consistency to the Voting Functions 
framework. 
 
 The following definition is a natural translation of the Participation property 
to the Voting Correspondences framework. 
 
Definition 4: A VC f satisfies the VC-Participation property if and only if for any 
given pair of situations (X,p) and (X,v), where profile v has only one voter,  
   If xÎf(X,p) and x is preferred to y in v, then (yÎf(X,p+v)  implies  xÎf(X,p+v) ). 
 
In other words, if candidate x is chosen for a situation and a new voter is added who 
strictly prefers x to y, candidate y will not be chosen if she is not accompanied by 
candidate x. 
 
 An easy adaptation of the proof (ii) in Moulin’s statement  (1988, p. 57-59), 
allows to establish proposition 3 as below. See Pérez (1995). 
 




3. THE STRONG NO SHOW PARADOX 
 
The following property can be easily shown to be a weakening of both Consistency 
and VC-Participation, and it may be seen as the minimum to require to any VC, 
concerning the coherence in the set of  winning candidates when new voters are 






Definition 5: A VC f satisfies the Positive Involvement property if and only if for 
any given pair of situations (X,p) and (X,v), where profile v has only one voter, 
If xÎf(X,p) and x is preferred to any y in v, then  xÎf(X,p+v). 
 
In other words, if candidate x is chosen, x will remain chosen when a new voter is 
added who prefers x to any other candidate.  Saari (1994) defines (in a slightly 
different way) Positive Involvement and shows that Correspondences defined by 
sequential pairwise comparisons according to a specified agenda fail to satisfy it. 
 The failure by an VC f to satisfy this property means that f suffers an acute 
form of Moulin's No Show Paradox, which we will call Strong No Show Paradox 
(SNSP). 
 Some Condorcet VCs that satisfy Positive Involvement do exist, as will be 
shown in proposition 6 below. 
 
3.1 Impossibility result for some families of Condorcet VCs. 
The following domination properties will be needed to identify families of 





Definition 6: Given a situation (X,p) and two candidates x and s, we say  s is C1-
dominated by x  if and only if the two following conditions hold: 
 a)  p(x,s) > p(s,x) 
 b) For any z Î X\{x,s}, if p(s,z) ³  p(z,s) then p(x,z) >  p(z,x).  
In other words, x beats s and x beats any candidate z beaten by, or tied with, s.  
 
Note: If we consider only the information conveyed by the Wp relation (thus 
focusing on the underlying Tournament structure of the situation), we can say: 
1) The C1-domination relation coincides with the covering relation defined 
in the context of strict tournaments, in which Wp is a complete relation ("x,y , if x¹y 
then xWpy or yWpx). See Fishburn (1977) and Laffond et al (1995). 
2) The C1-domination relation is stronger than any of the covering relations 
defined in the context of weak tournaments, in which Wp is the asymmetric part of a 
complete relation. Thus, if s is C1-dominated by x then s is covered by x. See Peris 
and Subiza (1999). 
 
Definition 7: Given a situation (X,p) and two candidates x and s, we say that s is 
C2-dominated by x if and only if the two following conditions hold: 
 a) p(x,s) > p(s,x) 
 b) For any z Î X \{x,s}, p(x,z) ³ p(s,z). 
In other words, x beats s, and x performs equal or better than s in the matrix Mp, in 
her confrontation with any other candidate. Both C1 and C2 domination concepts 
are generalizations of the Pareto Domination relation. 
 
Definition 8:  Given a situation (X,p) and two candidates x and s, we say that s is 
C2-quasidominated in differences by x if and only if the three following conditions 
hold: 
 a) p(x,s) > p(s,x). 
 b) p(x,z) ³ p(s,z) for any z Î X-{x,s} except perhaps for a unique z. 
 c) If p(x,z) < p(s,z),  then  p(x,s) - p(s,s) > p(s,z) - p(x,z). 
 





candidate, except perhaps with only one, say the z candidate, and the difference in 
favor of x in her confrontation with s (as expressed by the difference p(x,s)-p(s,s)) 
more than compensates for the difference in favor of s when both are confronted 
with z. Candidate z can be called the weak  point of x with respect to s. 
 
Definition 9: Let (X,p) be any situation. Given three different candidates x, y and s, 
we say that s is C2-dominated by the pair {x,y} if and only if the two following 
conditions hold: 
 a) Both x and y C2-quasidominate s in differences. 
 b) If wÎ{x,y} and p(w,z) < p(s,z),  then  p(y,z)-p(s,z) ³ p(s,z)-p(x,z). 
 That is to say, besides the fact that both x and y C2-quasidominate s, the 
performance of any of them at the weak point of the other is enough to compensate 
the poor performance of the other at its own weak point. This compensation causes 
that, in every column of  Mp, the entry corresponding to candidate s is equal or lower 
than the average of the entries corresponding to candidates x and y. 
 Although stronger, this definition is formulated in the spirit of the concept of 
weak domination of a pure strategy by a mixed strategy in finite strategic-form 
games. In fact, in the Bipartisan Plurality Game associated to a situation (X,p), 
defined in Laffond et al (1993, 1994), if a candidate s is C2-Dominated by the pair 
{x,y}, then the pure strategy s is weakly dominated by the mixed strategy 0.5x+0.5y. 
 Every concept of domination among candidates tell us that, from the 
perspective of this concept, a dominated candidate, being surpassed by other(s), does 
not perform sufficiently well in the preferences of voters and, therefore, does not 
deserve to win the election. So, for every concept of domination, it is relevant to 
pose the question of which VCs respect that concept, by not electing as a winner the 
dominated candidate or, at least, by not electing it as the unique winner. The 
following definition, being of a general character, is applicable to the four concepts 





Definition 10: A VC f  Weakly Respects the Q-Domination if and only if for any 
given situation (X,p),  (s is Q-Dominated  implies that f(X,p) ¹ {s}). 
(We say f Respect the Q-Domination if the consequent of the implication is 
sÏf(X,p)) 
 There is an obvious relation between the just defined properties of a VC and 
its refinements. Indeed, for any domination concept, if f is a refinement of g, the two 
following statements hold:  a) If g respects the Domination so does f. 
   b) If f weakly respects the Domination so does g. 
 
The following, the main proposition of the paper, establishes a logical 
incompatibility between Positive Involvement and some of the above defined 
domination concepts. 
 
Proposition 4:  No Condorcet VC that weakly respects the C1-Domination  or  
weakly respects the C2-Domination by a pair, satisfies the Positive Involvement 
property. 
 
Proof: The following lemma, whose proof is an easy adaptation of the proof of an 
analogous result in Moulin (1988a, p. 57) will be needed. 
 
Lemma 1: Given any Condorcet VC f satisfying Positive Involvement, any situation 
(X,p) and any two candidates x and z,     p(x,z) < MinyÎX p(z,y)  implies  x Ï f(X,p)  
Proof of the lemma: Let m be the number of voters in profile p, and suppose p(x,z) 
< Min yeX p(z,y). Iteratively adding to p a number h = p(z,x) - Min yeX p(z,y) of new 
voters, all with identical preference order xz..., the minimal entry of the z row in the 
new profile p' is p'(z,x) = p(z,x). On the other hand, p'(x,z) < p'(z,x), because p'(x,z) = 
p(x,z) + h = p(x,z) + p(z,x) - Min yeX p(z,y) = p(z,x) + [p(x,z) - Min yeX p(z,y)] < p(z,x) 
= p'(z,x). Hence, the minimal entry on the z row in profile p', p'(z,x), is higher than 
(m+h)/2, making z a Condorcet candidate in the new situation and, because of the 
supposed Condorcet property, the only candidate chosen. 





the new h voters are added, it would necessarily happen at some point that x will not 
be chosen, thus contradicting the Positive Involvement property.   
 
 To complete the proof of proposition 4, let X = {x,y,z,u,t} and p the 
following profile: [yxtuz (11 voters), uzytx (10 voters), xztyu (10 voters), uztyx (2 
voters), utzyx (2 voters), zyxtu (2 voters), tzyxu (1 voter), xytuz (1 voter)].  The paired 
comparison matrix is:  
       x y z u t 
     x 19.5 11 22 25 24 
      Mp:  y 28 19.5 12 25 24 
     z 17 27 19.5 13 24 
     u 14 14 26 19.5 14 
     t 15 15 15 25 19.5 
 
 Suppose f is Condorcet and satisfies Positive Involvement. From Lemma 1 
applied to the pairs (x,y), (y,z), (z,u) and (u,t), candidates x, y, z, and u are not chosen 
for (X,p), and thus candidate t is the only winner.  
 However, both x and y C1-Dominate t (y is the weak point of x and z is the 
weak point of y), and the pair {x,y} C2-Dominates t (the difference in favor of t at 
the weak point of x is p(t,y)-p(x,y)=4, while p(x,t)-p(t,t)=4.5 and p(y,y)-p(t,y)=4.5; in 
a similar way, the difference in favor of t at the weak point of y is p(t,z)-p(y,z)=3, 
while p(y,t)-p(t,t)=4.5 and p(x,z)-p(t,z)=7). Therefore,  f fails to weakly respect the 
C1-Domination and also fails to weakly respect the C2-Domination by a pair, hence 
concluding the proof.   
 
 Thus, proposition 4 shows that all sensible Condorcet C1-Correspondences 
(those that  weakly respect the C1-Domination) and the wide family of C2-
Correspondences that weakly respect the C2-Domination by a pair, suffer the Strong 
No Show Paradox. 
 





respecting the C2-Domination by a pair, and to which Proposition 4 is consequently 
applicable. 
 Given any situation (X,p), let w={wk}kÎ{1,2,...,n-1} be a nonnegative real vector 
with n-1 components, such that w1=1. For every order l:  x1x2...xn of candidates, let 
us suppose that the rows and columns of Mp are ordered according to l. The sum 
Si<jwipij, where pij =p(xi , xj). will be called the w-Generalized Kemeny Score of l, 
abbreviated K(l,w). We say that f is a w-Generalized Kemeny Correspondence 
 if and only if, for every situation (X,p), the winners are those candidates who are at 
the top of an order which has a maximal w-Generalized Kemeny Score. 
 It is easy to see that the Borda VC and the Kemeny VC can be selected as 
particular cases of this definition. Borda is selected if wk=0 when k>1, while 
Kemeny is selected if  wk=1 for every k. 
 
Proposition 5:  Every w-Generalized Kemeny Correspondence f respects the C2-
Domination by a pair. 
 
Proof: Let (X,p) be a situation in which t is C2-Quasidominated by x, 
w={wk}kÎ{1,2,...,n-1} be the weights vector of f, and l: x1...xr...xn be an order of X where 
x1=t and  xr=x. Let xs be the weak point of x with respect to t. We will prove that 
interchanging in l the first candidate t with candidate x, the resulting lxt order has a 
w-Generalized Kemeny Score higher than that of l.  
The sums defining the scores of l and lxt differ only in two rows, the first row and the 
r-row, so that   K(lxt , w) - K(l , w) =   
= (S r¹j w1 prj  - S1<j w1 p1j ) + (Sr<j wr p1j  - Sr<j wr prj) =  
=(w1 pr1 +S 1<j<r w1 prj   +S r<j w1 prj  - w1 p1r - S1<j<r w1 p1j - Sj< r w1 p1j) + (Sr<j wr 
p1j  - Sr<j wr prj) =  
= w1 (pr1 - p1r )+ w1 S1<j<r (prj-p1j )+ w1 Sr<j (prj - p1j ) + wr Sr<j (p1j - prj) =  
=w1 (pr1 - p1r )+ w1 S1<j<r (prj - p1j ) + (w1- wr )Sr<j (prj - p1j ). 
As x=xr quasi dominates t=x1  in differences, and w1>w1-wr: 
 If s<r, K(lxt , w) - K(l , w) ³ w1(pr1 - p1r )+w1(prs - p1s) > 0 





Therefore, in any case, the order lxt has a w-Generalized Kemeny Score higher than 
that of l, which excludes t from being a winner, thus completing the proof.   
 
 The situation described in the proof of proposition 4, in which there is no 
Condorcet Candidate, along with proposition 5, allows us to conclude that no 
Condorcet VC which coincides with a w-Generalized Kemeny Correspondence 




4. INCIDENCE OF THE PARADOX IN KNOWN CONDORCET 
  CORRESPONDENCES. 
 
4.1 C1-Correspondences. 
As shown by proposition 4, all reasonable Condorcet C1-Correspondences (that is, 
those weakly respecting the C1-Domination) suffer the Strong No Show Paradox. In 
order to see that no Condorcet C1-Correspondence proposed in the literature (as far 
as I know) is free from the paradox, we only need to analyze in detail the Top Cycle 
(fTC) and the Uncovered Set (fUS) correspondences:  
fTC (X,p) º{xÎX: there is no yÎX such that  yWWpx and (not  xWWpy)} 
fUS(X,p) º {xÎX: there is no yÎX such that  (xWpz   implies   yWpz)} 
 
If s is C1-dominated by x, then s is beaten by x, so that s can not belong to 
fTC (X,p) if x does not. Therefore, fTC weakly respects the C1-Domination and, by 
proposition 4, suffers SNSP. 
On the other hand, if s is C1-dominated by x, then s is covered by x, so that s 
can not belong to fUS (X,p). Therefore, fUS respects the C1-Domination and, by 
proposition 4, suffers SNSP. Observe that this is a valid argument for any definition 
of the covering relation, thus it applies to the correspondences known as Fishburn’s 
function and Miller's Uncovered set correspondence, and also to those Uncovered 





Furthermore, all the others neutral C1-correspondences proposed in the 
literature are, to our knowledge, refinements of the Uncovered set correspondence, 
hence they all respect the C1-Domination. This is the case of the following 
correspondences, and also of their counterparts in weak tournaments: Copeland, 
Slater, Kendall-Wei, Dutta's Minimal Covering, Banks, Laffond's Bipartisan 
Tournament Set, and Schwartz's Tournament Equilibrium. See Fishburn 
(1977), Moulin (1986), Dutta (1988), Laffond et al (1993, 1995), Levin and 
Nalebuff (1995) and Peris and Subiza (1999). 
 
4.2 C2-Correspondences. 
Proposition 4 shows that all Condorcet C2-Correspondences satisfying a very weak 
compensation property (that is, those weakly respecting the C2-Domination by a 
pair) suffer the Strong No Show Paradox.  
On the other hand, all w-Generalized Kemeny correspondences are, by 
proposition 5, shown to respect the C2-Domination by a pair. Let us begin analyzing 
the Black and Kemeny correspondences (fBLACK and fKEM). See Fishburn (1977), 
Young and Levenglick (1978), and Young (1995). 
fBLACK(X,p) º  {c}  if a Condorcet candidate c exists,  
      {xÎX: x has a maximal Borda Score}, in any other case. 
 
fKEM (X,p) º  {xÎX: x is at the top of an order l with maximal Kemeny Score} 
 
The first correspondence applies the Borda algorithm when no Condorcet 
Candidate exists, while the second applies always the Kemeny algorithm. Therefore, 
both are w-Generalized  Kemeny correspondences (w1=1 and wk=0 when k>1, for 
the case of Black, and wk=1 for every k, for the case of Kemeny). Therefore, both 
suffer SNSP. 
 
Now we will show that Nanson’s and Simplified Dogdson’s 
correspondences (fNAN and fS.DOG) respect the C2-Domination by a pair, because no 






fNAN (X,p) º limj®¥ Xj,     where X1 = X      and 
    Xj+1=    Xj ,   if all candidates in Xj  have the same Borda Score on (Xj , 
p/Xj). 
   Xj \{xÎXj: The Borda Score of x on (Xj, p/Xj) is minimal},  in any other 
case. 
(Observe that the algorithm operates in an iterative fashion, eliminating all 
candidates with a worst Borda Score in the actual situation, except when all 
candidates have the same Borda Score) 
fS. DOG(X,p) º {xÎX: x needs a minimal number of elemental interchanges 
in  
Mp to become a Condorcet Candidate}  
 
If t is quasidominated by x in differences, the Borda score of t is lower than 
that of x at any step of the elimination process. Hence, candidate t (which will be 
eliminated before x) is not a winner in fNAN (X,p). On the other hand, the number of 
elemental interchanges in Mp needed by t to become a Condorcet Candidate is 
obviously higher than that needed by x. This implies that t cannot be a winner in 
fS.DOG(X,p). Therefore, both fNAN and fS.DOG respect the C2-Domination by a pair, and 
suffer SNSP. 
 
 Let us analyze now the Laffond's Bipartisan Plurality Set correspondence 
(fBPS). Defined in Laffond et al  (1994), it respects the C2-Domination by a pair. Let 
(X,p) be any situation in which p(x,y)¹p(y,x) for every x¹y. 
fBPS(X,p) º {xÎX: x belongs to the support of the unique symmetric Nash  
     Equilibrium of the Bipartisan Plurality Game of  (X,p)} 
 
Let (X,p) be any situation in which, as in that of the proof of Proposition 4, 
p(u,v)¹p(v,u) for every two different candidates u and v. Laffond et al (1994) have 
shown that the Bipartisan Plurality Game of this situation has a unique Nash 





candidate t is C2-Dominated by the pair {x,y}. If a player of the game plays strategy 
t with a strictly positive probability f, the best response of the other player can not 
include t in its support (Indeed, he would obtain a strictly higher payoff by 
transferring the probability f from t to 0.5x+0.5y). Therefore, t cannot be in the 
support of the unique symmetric Nash Equilibrium of the game, and thus t is not a 
winner in fBPS(X,p). Hence, fBPS respects the C2-Domination by a pair in this type of 
situations and suffers SNSP.  
 
 Let us show now that the Tideman's Ranked Pairs correspondence (fRP), 
defined and studied in Tideman (1987) and Zavist and Tideman (1989), suffers the 
SNSP despite the fact that it does not weakly respect the C2-Domination by a pair 
nor the C1-Domination. 
fRP (X,p)   º   {xÎX: x is the top candidate of a stack l} 
 
In the situation of the proof of proposition 4, candidate t is the only winner 
because tuzyx is the unique stack. Thus, fRP does not weakly respect the C2-
Domination by a pair nor the C1-Domination. Nevertheless, let X = {x,y,z,u} and p 
the following 11-voters profile: [uzyx (3 voters), xzyu (3 voters), yuxz (3 voters), 
zyxu (1 voter), xyuz (1 voter)]. Let p' be the profile p+v where v is the one-voter 
profile with preferences xyuz. The comparison matrices are:  
 
   Mp          Mp' 
 x y z u     x y z u 
x 5.5 4 7 5   x 6 5 8 6 
y 7 5.5 4 8   y 7 6 5 9           
z 4 7 5.5 4   z 4 7 6 4 
u 6 3 7 5.5   u 6 3 8 6 
 
We will prove that x is elected in (X,p) but not in (X,p'). Let us first see that 
the order l: xzyu is a stack of (X,p). Candidate x attains z through l in (X,p) because 





because p(x,z) ³  p(u,x),  p(z,y) ³  p(u,x) and   p(y,u) ³  p(u,x). Candidate z attains y 
because p(z,y)>p(y,z), and attains u because p(z,y) ³  p(u,z) and p(y,u) ³  p(u,z). 
Candidate y attains u because p(y,u) > p(u,y). Therefore, candidate x is a winner. 
 Let us now see that no order with x at the top can be a stack of (X,p'). For the 
order l: xz1z2z3 to be a stack, it is necessary that any candidate in l beats or ties in 
(X,p') to his immediate successor. The only orders with x at the top and satisfying 
this necessary condition are l1:xzyu and l2:xuzy. However, l1:xzyu is not a stack 
because z fails to attain u through l1 in (X,p') and l2:xuzy is not a stack because u fails 
to attain y through l2 in (X,p'), thus x is not a winner in (X,p'). Therefore, fRP fails to 
satisfy Positive Involvement and suffers SNSP. 
 
The last C2-correspondence to be analyzed, the Simpson-Cramer Minmax 
correspondence (fMINMAX), is (as far as I know) the only one known Condorcet 
correspondence not affected by the paradox. See Fishburn (1977) and Young (1995). 
fMINMAX(X,p)º{xÎX: The minimal off-diagonal term of row x in Mp is 
maximal} 
Let us show that fMINMAX satisfies the Positive Involvement property. Let 
(X,p) be any situation, z1 a winner candidate for (X,p), and (X,v) be any one-voter's 
situation with preferences l: z1...zn . Call p' the profile p+v. The matrix Mp' of the 
new situation is: 
   p'(x,y) = p(x,y) + 1   if x¹y and xly. 
       p(x,y) + ½   if x=y 
       p(x,y)  in any other case 
As supposed, the z1 row has a maximal minimal off-diagonal entry in Mp. Let p(z1, 
zj) a minimal off-diagonal entry of the z1 row in Mp. Since p'(z1, z)= p(z1, z)+1 for 
every z¹z1, while p'(x, y)£p(x, y)+1 for every x,y, it is obvious that p'(z1, zj) is also a 
minimal off-diagonal entry of the z1 row in Mp' , and that the z1 row has a maximal 
minimal off-diagonal entry in Mp. Therefore, z1 is a winner in the new situation.  
 
4.3 C3-Correspondences. 





The statement of proposition 4 is not applicable to these correspondences. However, 
some of the arguments used in this proposition may be applicable, and in fact are. 
Let us analyze the two C3-correspondences proposed in the literature, the Dogdson 
and the Young correspondences (fDOG and fYOUNG). See Fishburn (1977). We will see 
that both suffer the SNSP. 
fDOG (X,p) º {xÎX: The number of elemental interchanges in (X,p) needed 
 by x to become a Condorcet Candidate is minimal}  
fYOUNG(X,p) º {xÎX: The number of excluded voters in (X,p) needed  
by x to  become a Condorcet Candidate is minimal} 
 
Note: Fishburn (1977) provides slightly different definitions of Dogdson and Young 
correspondences. Firstly, they are based on the concept of QuasiCondorcet 
Candidates (those that beat or tie every other) and secondly, he introduces a limit 
process in order to avoid that these correspondences fail satisfying homogeneity. 
The results obtained in this paper are not affected by these modifications. 
In the situation (X,p) described in the proof of proposition 4, since candidate 
t needs more than 12 elemental interchanges in (X,p) to become a Condorcet 
Candidate, while y needs only 8 (obtained by switching y and z in 8 voters with 
preferences uzytx), t is not chosen in fDOG(X,p). On the other hand, and for the same 
situation, since  candidate u needs only the removal of 12 voters (the ten voters with 
preferences xztyu and the two with preferences zyxtu) to become a Condorcet 
Candidate, while t needs more than 12 voters removed, t is not chosen in 
fYOUNG(X,p).  Therefore, both fDOG and fYOUNG fail to satisfy Positive Involvement 




5. FINAL REMARKS. 
 
Remark 1: A practical question, which has not been dealt with here, refers to the 





a situation with 5 candidates and 39 voters was needed in the proof of proposition 4, 
usually a simpler situation (typically of 4 candidates and a number of voters between 
15 and 30) is enough to build a counterexample of the Positive Involvement 
property for any given method.  
 
Remark 2 (a stronger and a weaker version of the paradox):  We can define an 
even stronger no show paradox, called SNSP
+, in the following way:  
 
Definition 11: A VC f  is said to satisfy the Weak Positive Involvement property if 
and only if for any situation (X,p), there is a winner x such that: 
   If (X,v) is a one-voter situation with favorite candidate x, then  x Î f(X,p+v). 
In other words, at least one winner x will remain a winner when a new voter,  
who prefers x to any other candidate, is added. An VC f that fails to satisfy this 
property is said to suffer SNSP
+. 
 
The proof of proposition 4 remains obviously valid for the following 
alternative statement: "No Condorcet VC that respects the C1-Domination  or  
respects the C2-Domination by a pair, satisfies the Weak Positive Involvement 
property". Among the VCs studied in this paper which suffer SNSP, all suffer this 
new paradox, except the Top Cycle VC and (perhaps) the Tideman's Ranked Pairs 
VC. The reason is that in the situation (X,p) described in the proof of proposition 4, 
none of them chooses candidate t as a winner. 
 
On the other hand, if we allow ties in the voter's preferences, a paradox 
weaker than SNSP, and affecting every Condorcet VC, can be defined in the 
following way:  
 
Definition 12: A VC f satisfies the Positive Involvement with ties allowed property 
if and only if for any given pair of situations (X,p) and (X,v), where profile v has 
only one voter, 






In other words, if candidate x is a winner, x will remain a winner when a new  
voter is added for whom no candidate is strictly preferred to x. 
To establish the following proposition, let us make some necessary, but 
natural modifications in the definition of Mp: 
 p(x,y) = Si=1,...,n (1/i)pi(x,y),  where p1(x,y) is the number of voters who 
strictly prefer x over y and pj(x,y), when j>1, is the number of voters who have x 
sharing with y a j-candidates tie. If there are no ties, p(x,y) has the usual meaning. 
 
Proposition 6: No Condorcet VC f satisfies the Positive Involvement with ties 
allowed property. 
Proof: Let  f be a Condorcet VC, X={x,y,z} and p be the following classical 
symmetric profile p=[xyz (1 voter), yzx (1 voter), zxy (1 voter)]. Let us suppose that, 
without any loss of generality, x is a winner. Then, if we add to p two new voters 
with preferences x~z>y, candidate z becomes a Condorcet candidate and, as a 
consequence, the only winner. Thus x becomes a loser when the first voter is added 
or when the second voter is added. Therefore, f fails to satisfy the Positive 
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